Rational Ritual: Culture, Coordination, and Common Knowledge

Read [Michael Suk-Young Chwe Book] * Rational Ritual: Culture, Coordination, and Common Knowledge Online * PDF eBook or Kindle ePUB free. Rational Ritual: Culture, Coordination, and Common Knowledge By using a rational-choice argument to explain diverse cultural practices, Chwe argues for a close reciprocal relationship between the perspectives of rationality and culture. Game theory shows that in order to coordinate its actions, a group of people must form common knowledge. He shows that public ceremonies are powerful not simply because they transmit meaning from a central source to each audience member but because they let audience members know what other members know. Each person wants

Rational Ritual: Culture, Coordination, and Common Knowledge

Author :
Rating : 4.93 (657 Votes)
Asin : B00ZS5NKSG
Format Type :
Number of Pages : 275 Pages
Publish Date : 2013-06-12
Language : English

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Four Stars Amazon Customer A good book.. Nice Extension of Game Theory Sean Everton This book is a nice extension of game theory into the area of culture and ritual. Some of Chwe's arguments seem a bit of a stretch, but I think his basic premise is sound.. Mark T. said I now consider this book to be one of my best "secret weapons" when thinking about business tactics and strategy. This is an interesting and compelling book. Although it is not really written as a marketing or business text, it has much to offer in those areas. The ideas in the book form a tool set that can be used to explain why successful companies do the things that t

By using a rational-choice argument to explain diverse cultural practices, Chwe argues for a close reciprocal relationship between the perspectives of rationality and culture. Game theory shows that in order to coordinate its actions, a group of people must form "common knowledge". He shows that public ceremonies are powerful not simply because they transmit meaning from a central source to each audience member but because they let audience members know what other members know. Each person wants to participate only if others also participate. He illustrates how game theory can be applied to an unexpectedly broad spectrum of problems while showing in an admirably clear way what game theory might hold for scholars in the social sciences and humanities who are not yet acquainted with it. In a new afterword, Chwe delves into new applications of common knowledge both in the real world

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